

PROPOSED MODEL - THE POLITICAL UNION

(This document to be further developed and upgraded by Global Citizens and founders of the Earth Union.)

Core issue: The design challenge for the Political Union is not to assume that humanity will become unselfish. It is to construct institutions in which rivalry, ambition and disagreements are constrained by law, and cooperation becomes more advantageous than conflict.

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1. Executive assessment

Humanity cannot move directly from sovereign nation-states to a strong unified federation of nations. A durable Political Union must evolve gradually from the recognition of ONE human family and from practical economic cooperation that demonstrates the benefits of solidarity. It should therefore become the final constitutional layer of the Earth Union, developing in parallel with the Spiritual and Economic Unions but never ahead of the trust they create, rather than becoming its starting institution. Its foundations should include equal respect for nations, citizen legitimacy, need-based human development, dialogue before force, effective peace mechanisms, **and safeguards against the structural weaknesses of the United Nations**. At the same time, power must not be concentrated in a single President or Governing Council, binding decisions should not rely solely on “One Nation, One Vote” or frequent referendums, and an independent judiciary must protect constitutional balance.

The goal should be a democratic federation of nations in which powers are shared only where global interests require common action, while member nations retain substantial autonomy over their internal affairs.

Recommended constitutional direction

Political Union should evolve from a voluntary confederation into a limited constitutional union only as member nations demonstrate trust, accept binding law in narrowly defined global matters, and consent to each transfer of sovereignty. The governing principle should be: global power only where the problem is genuinely global; national and local power everywhere else.

Five governance features:

1. Replace pure One Nation, One Vote with dual legitimacy: a Council of Nations and an Assembly of Humanity.
2. Replace presidential dominance with separation of powers, judicial review, independent audit, rights protection and fixed terms.
3. Make The Earth Union (TEU) competences enumerated, limited and governed by subsidiarity; powers not expressly transferred remain national.
4. Make courts and graduated enforcement binding within agreed competences; do not rely on voluntary compliance alone.
5. Build union in stages: moral/civic solidarity and development cooperation first; limited binding law next; collective security and deeper political union only after decades of demonstrated trust.

2. Constitutional foundation: one humanity, plural identities

The Spiritual Union can provide the moral energy for the Earth Union, but it should not become a religious test for political rights. The most workable constitutional foundation is broader: “Humanity is one human family. Every human being possesses equal dignity, irrespective of nationality, race, religion, belief or non-belief.” This distinction is essential. The Spiritual Union may invite religions to discover common truth, recognize ONE God of humanity and voluntarily reform doctrines or interpretations that divide human beings. The Political Union, however, must protect freedom of conscience and cannot possess authority to define theology. Otherwise, the project intended to unite humanity could itself become coercive.

Six non-negotiable constitutional principles

- a) **Limited conferral of power:** The Earth Union may act only in fields expressly transferred to it by treaty or constitution. All residual powers remain with member nations.
- b) **Subsidiarity and proportionality:** A matter moves to Earth Union level only when national action cannot reasonably solve it and the global benefit outweighs the loss of local autonomy.
- c) **Dual democratic legitimacy:** Nations are equal as nations; people are represented in proportion to population. Both principles represented institutionally.
- d) **Rule of law above power:** No individual, country, corporation, religion or Earth Union institution is above the constitution or independent court.
- e) **Fundamental rights:** The Charter must guarantee freedom of conscience, speech, due process, equality, minority rights and democratic participation.
- f) **Peaceful and reversible integration:** New powers are acquired only through defined democratic ratification. Withdrawal remains possible through an orderly procedure, but cannot erase accrued liabilities or pending legal obligations.

3. Enumerated competences of the Political Union

A union that does not list its own powers will be feared, and rightly so. The Earth Union Charter should therefore contain an express list of competences, drafted on the European model in which the Union may act only within the limits of the powers conferred on it and all powers not conferred remain with the member nations. Three categories are enough.

- a) **Exclusive Earth Union competence** — a short list where a single global rule is the only workable rule: the common regime of the high seas and the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, the peaceful use of outer space, planetary-scale geoengineering, verification and arms-control regimes for weapons of mass destruction as members progressively accept them (see the Nuclear weapons section), the prohibition of fully autonomous lethal weapons, and the Union's own institutions, budget and civil service.
- b) **Shared competence** — the Union may set minimum standards and members may go further: climate and biodiversity, pandemic preparedness and response, cross-border environmental harm, transnational organized crime and terrorism, refugee protection, disaster relief, frontier technologies including artificial intelligence and cyber security, and international tax cooperation.
- c) **Supporting competence** — the Union may coordinate, fund and evaluate but may not legislate: education, culture, health-system organization, language policy, family law, land ownership and all matters of local government.

Everything not written into the first two categories stays national, and religion is deliberately excluded from all three: the Union may neither legislate on nor fund religious bodies. The Charter should say so expressly, should require a treaty amendment ratified by both chambers and by member nations to add any new competence, and should give national parliaments a direct right to object that a draft Union act breaches subsidiarity. A union that can quietly expand its own jurisdiction is not a federation but an empire, and no self-respecting nation will ratify it.

Design rule: powers are conferred, listed and reversible. The burden of proof always lies on the Union to show that a matter cannot be handled adequately at national or regional level.

4. Institutional architecture

Institution	Core role
Council of Nations	One representative per member state; protects sovereign equality. Ordinary laws within TEU competence require a supermajority, not unanimity. No permanent-member veto.
Assembly of Humanity	Directly elected by citizens. Seats broadly follow population using degressive proportionality so populous countries receive more seats without erasing small nations.
Earth Union Executive	President/Chair and cabinet administer laws and budgets. In early phases, elected by or requiring confidence of both chambers; fixed term, two-term maximum, no unilateral power to expand TEU competence.
Global Court of the Earth Union	Independent judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction over TEU law and interstate disputes covered by the Charter. Judges selected through a balanced, transparent process and protected from political removal.
Rights & Constitutional Commission	Receives complaints, monitors fundamental rights and can initiate constitutional review or refer matters to the Court.
Auditor-General & Integrity Authority	Independent audit, procurement oversight, anti-corruption investigations, public asset declarations and transparent accounts.
Electoral & Democratic Standards Commission	Supervises Earth Union elections and minimum democratic standards for full membership.
Citizens' Initiative & Deliberative Forum	Verified cross-border citizen initiatives can compel formal consideration; periodic citizens' assemblies can examine complex long-term questions.

5. Decision making

The original principle that citizens should endorse national votes correctly rejects rule by an elite club of governments. But referendums on every policy would paralyze the system. Citizen sovereignty is better protected through direct election of the Assembly of Humanity, transparent law-making, citizen initiatives and referendums reserved for constitutional questions.

Decision	Suggested threshold
Routine law within existing TEU competence	Majority in Assembly of Humanity + at least 60% of Council of Nations.
Budget, sanctions or major redistribution (any new tax or own resource also requires the treaty procedure in the Financing section)	At least 60% of Assembly + two-thirds of Council; published fiscal-impact assessment.
Peace enforcement / collective-security deployment	Two-thirds of both chambers; independent legal finding where applicable; states directly involved do not vote on authorization; strict time limit and review.
New TEU competence / sovereignty transfer	Two-thirds of both chambers + ratification under each member's constitutional process; for major transfers, national or simultaneous referendums may be required.
Constitutional amendment affecting rights or institutional balance	Two-thirds of both chambers + supermajority of member states representing a substantial majority of the TEU population; judicial certification that amendment does not abolish core democratic rights.

Why this is better than One Nation, One Vote

Pure state equality is appropriate for diplomatic equality but becomes indefensible when binding law is made, because a rule can then be imposed on most of humanity by states representing very few people. **The European Union solves this with a double majority: a qualified majority in the Council requires 55% of member states (at least 15 of 27) representing at least 65% of the Union population, and a blocking minority must contain at least four Council members.** A reinforced qualified majority of 72% of states applies where the Council acts without a Commission proposal. The Earth Union should apply the same double-majority principle across its two chambers — nations equal as nations in the Council of Nations; citizens represented broadly in proportion to population, with degressive proportionality, in the Assembly of Humanity — together with an explicit blocking-minority floor so that two or three large states cannot veto and a numerous group of very small states cannot legislate for everyone else.

6. Binding law, courts and enforcement

The dividing line between cooperation and union is whether members accept lawful decisions even when they lose. The present International Court of Justice can generally act only when states have consented to its jurisdiction. A mature Political Union must go further: by joining, states voluntarily accept compulsory jurisdiction of the Global Court for the limited fields transferred to the Earth Union.

Enforcement should be graduated and predominantly non-military:

- Court declaration and compliance timetable;
 - Financial penalties or withholding of TEU funds;
 - Temporary suspension of specified voting or program privileges;
 - Coordinated diplomatic, trade or asset measures where constitutionally authorized;
 - Collective security action only for aggression, genocide or comparable grave breaches, and only after exceptionally high legal and democratic thresholds.
- The EU demonstrates that supranational law can be made meaningful without routine force: Court judgments are binding, and continued non-compliance can lead to lump-sum or periodic financial penalties.
- The lesson for the Earth Union is that enforcement should become predictable, legal and proportionate before it becomes military.

Citizen participation beyond elections

A global polity needs a visible route from citizen concern to institutional agenda. A TEU Citizens' Initiative could require a threshold of verified supporters distributed across multiple member countries; once met, the Executive and both chambers would have to hold a hearing, and the initiative would then be tabled, debated and voted in the Assembly of Humanity within a fixed period (see the Elections section). The European Citizens' Initiative shows that transnational agenda-setting can operate without turning every question into a referendum.

7. Relationship with the United Nations and existing treaty law

The Earth Union should not be presented as a replacement for the United Nations, and it cannot lawfully be one. Article 103 of the UN Charter gives Charter obligations priority over conflicting treaty obligations, and the law of treaties allows a group of parties to deepen their commitments among themselves only where the wider treaty provides for it or does not prohibit it, the rights of other parties are not affected and the modification is compatible with the treaty's object and purpose. The sound reading is therefore that the United Nations remains the universal forum of all 193 states, while the Earth Union is a deeper union among those willing to accept binding law in listed fields. Membership of one must never require withdrawal from the other.

That relationship should be written into the Charter in three ways: a clause stating that Union law is interpreted in conformity with the UN Charter and with existing human-rights treaty obligations; a standing cooperation agreement with the United Nations, its specialized agencies and the international courts; and a rule that where the Union legislates in a field already covered by a global treaty, it does so to raise the floor and never to lower it. The 2024 Pact for the Future already

commits states to a more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable system of global governance; the Union should present itself as delivery of that commitment rather than as a rival to it.

There is also a warning to absorb. The World Trade Organization once had the most effective binding dispute settlement in international economic law, and it stopped working simply because one member declined to approve new appointments: the Appellate Body has had no sitting members since 30 November 2020. The states that wanted appeals to survive built an interim arrangement outside the blocked institution, and the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement now covers 62 WTO members representing about 60.4% of world trade. The lesson for the Earth Union is precise: judicial appointments must be automatic. If the Global Court's benches can be emptied by inaction, they will be.

The counter-example is equally instructive. The agreement on marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction was adopted in 2023, reached the required 60 ratifications and entered into force on 17 January 2026, and had 101 parties as at 29 September 2026. Ambitious new global law is still possible; it takes a coalition willing to ratify.

8. The primacy problem: when national constitutional courts resist

Every real union eventually faces the moment when a national court says that union law has gone too far. In May 2020 the German Federal Constitutional Court held that both the European Central Bank's asset-purchase program and the Court of Justice's judgment approving it were, in its view, outside the powers conferred by the treaties. In October 2021 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal held that specified provisions of the Treaty on European Union were incompatible with the Polish Constitution. Neither ruling destroyed the Union, but both showed that primacy is a political settlement, not a self-executing mechanism.

The European response is worth studying because it separated two instruments that are often confused. The Article 7 procedure, which can suspend a member's voting rights, has been triggered twice and has never resulted in a sanction: the Polish procedure was closed in May 2024 and the Hungarian one remains open without a determination. What did produce change was money. Under the budget conditionality regulation, the Council suspended about €6.3 billion — 55% of the commitments under three cohesion programs — by Council decision of 15 December 2022. Financial consequences, applied through an ordinary legislative instrument with judicial review, proved more usable than a constitutional nuclear option that requires near-unanimity. Recurrent non-compliance with judgments is likewise met with penalties: in a March 2025 judgment against Italy for failing to comply with an earlier ruling on urban waste-water treatment the Court of Justice imposed a lump sum of €10 million and a periodic penalty of €13,687,500 for each six months of continued default.

The Earth Union should draw four design conclusions.

1. State primacy expressly and confine it to conferred competences.
2. Create a preliminary-reference procedure so national judges can ask the Global Court a question before deciding, which converts confrontation into dialogue.
3. Constitute a mixed chamber of Global Court and national constitutional-court judges to hear competence disputes, so that no court is asked to surrender unconditionally to another.
4. Make graduated financial consequences the normal enforcement route and reserve suspension of voting rights for the gravest breaches.

A final caution about judicial independence. States can and do retaliate against international judges: United States sanctions issued under an executive order of February 2025 were extended on 18 August 2026 to further International Criminal Court officials, including the Court's President. Hungary, which announced its withdrawal from the Rome Statute in 2025, withdrew that notification on 29 May 2026, so the Court still has 125 States Parties; however, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger lodged withdrawal notifications in June 2026 that take effect in June 2027. Any Charter drafted for the Earth Union must therefore protect the salaries, immunities, families and travel of its judges by treaty, and must treat coercion of the Court as a breach of the Charter itself.

9. A multi-generation pathway: union by demonstrated trust

The Earth Union should be milestone-driven, not date-driven. No phase should begin merely because time has passed; it should begin only when previous institutions have earned legitimacy and member societies are willing to accept the next transfer of authority. An illustrative horizon could span 50-75 years.

Stage	Spiritual Union	Economic Union	Political Union
Phase 0 — Human-family movement	Spiritual: interfaith and ethical dialogue; voluntary One Human Family declaration; no religious test.	Economic: connect existing public-good networks, philanthropy, digital public infrastructure and development initiatives; demonstrate practical cross-border benefit.	Political: civil-society movement, research network and voluntary Global Citizens forum; draft a Charter of Principles rather than seek sovereign power.
Phase I — Founding Coalition	Spiritual: participating communities affirm equal dignity and freedom of conscience while pursuing theological convergence voluntarily.	Economic: establish a Global Development Compact and audited fund focused on agreed minimum conditions: nutrition, water, sanitation, health, education, energy and digital access.	Political: 10-30 willing states from several regions sign a treaty for mediation, data-sharing, common standards and peaceful dispute settlement; institutions remain mainly confederal.
Phase II — Limited Constitutional Union	Spiritual: cross-border civic education strengthens human-family identity without erasing nationality or religion.	Economic: common rules on transparency, anti-corruption, digital public goods, selected trade facilitation and development financing.	Political: Council of Nations + directly elected Assembly of Humanity + Global Court. Binding law applies only to enumerated global competences.
Phase III — Deeper Solidarity & Collective Security	Spiritual: the human-family principle becomes part of civic culture and constitutional morality.	Economic: larger shared budget, stronger development floor, selected mobility and common-market arrangements among willing members.	Political: graduated enforcement becomes routine; pooled standby peace/monitoring capabilities; arms-control and verified disarmament arrangements deepen.

Phase IV — Mature Earth Union	Spiritual: legitimate diversity persists within a widely internalized human-family identity.	Economic: substantial fiscal solidarity and coordinated policy for genuinely global public goods, without requiring identical domestic economic systems.	Political: federal features only where consent has matured; robust collective security; compulsory court jurisdiction extended to further transferred fields; constitutional supremacy in transferred fields; possible broader disarmament.
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Why not wait for Spiritual Union to be “completed” first?

Because the three unions should reinforce one another. Spiritual dialogue can enlarge the circle of moral concern; successful economic cooperation can make solidarity tangible; fair political institutions can reduce fear that cooperation means domination. Progress in any one track builds trust for the others. The mistake would be to make Political Union dependent on universal theological agreement, or to create strong political institutions before moral and economic trust exists.

Founding membership should be deliberately limited

Universal membership on Day One is neither necessary nor desirable. A founding coalition should include a geographically and economically diverse group of states willing to accept transparent elections, independent adjudication, audited contributions and binding adverse judgments. Countries not yet prepared for those obligations could participate as observers or associates. Expansion should follow demonstrated performance, not diplomatic pressure.

10. Peace, security and the hardest sovereignty questions

The original proposal is right that an organization unable to restrain aggression will eventually face the same credibility problem that weak international institutions face today. But a standing Earth Union military created too early would be one of the greatest risks in the project. Security integration should therefore proceed in layers.

A safer security sequence

1. Start with permanent mediation, early-warning, election-support, ceasefire-monitoring and civilian peace services.
2. Create pooled standby police, disaster-response and peacekeeping contingents contributed by member states, under TEU training and command standards.
3. Move to limited collective defense only after the Global Court, two chambers and rights safeguards are functioning credibly.
4. Require legal review, two-chamber supermajorities, exclusion of directly interested states from the authorization vote, narrow mandates, independent inspectors and automatic expiry of any force authorization.
5. Do not give the President unilateral authority to deploy force except for tightly defined emergency protection subject to immediate judicial and legislative review.

UN peacekeeping itself is built around consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. That is a deliberate limitation, not an oversight, and it explains why peacekeeping can hold a ceasefire but cannot impose a settlement. As at late 2025 the United Nations was running eleven peacekeeping operations with about 58,187 uniformed personnel on an approved annual budget of roughly USD 5.4 billion — a fraction of world military spending. A Political Union that intends to enforce judgments must therefore decide, in advance and in law, where it will keep the peacekeeping model and where it will not.

Nuclear weapons

A mature Political Union cannot coexist indefinitely with members retaining an unconstrained right to use weapons capable of destroying the human family, but disarmament cannot be a precondition of membership either — that would exclude precisely the states whose participation matters most. The realistic sequence is transparency, then no-first-use commitments, then verified reduction, then legal prohibition.

- The current environment makes this harder rather than easier: the New START treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation expired on 5 February 2026 and, because it had already been extended once, could not be extended again, leaving no negotiated limit on the two largest arsenals and no successor or interim arrangement in force.
- The Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons has 95 signatories and 75 States Parties, but no nuclear-weapon state has joined it, while the Non-Proliferation Treaty has 191 parties.

The Political Union should therefore treat verified arms control as one of its earliest concrete achievements rather than a distant aspiration, and should build its own decision rules so that no single member's arsenal confers constitutional privilege.

11. Rights architecture: derogation limits, minorities and indigenous peoples

A union with binding law needs a rights charter that binds the union itself. The starting point already exists in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows derogation in a public emergency but places seven guarantees permanently beyond suspension: the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the prohibition of slavery and servitude, the prohibition of imprisonment for inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, the prohibition of retroactive criminal law, recognition as a person before the law, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The Siracusa Principles of 1985 add the practical tests — legality, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination and time limitation — that decide whether an emergency measure is lawful or merely convenient.

Freedom of conscience and religion deserves particular emphasis in a project that begins with Spiritual Union. The Charter must protect belief, unbelief, change of belief and public expression of belief with exactly equal force, and must expressly deny any religion, denomination or spiritual movement — including any associated with the founding of the Earth Union — privileged access to Union office, Union funds or Union law-making.

Rights on paper require a route to a court. The Council of Europe, with 46 member states, made individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights compulsory through Protocol No. 11 (adopted in 1994, in force from 1998), and that single reform turned a diplomatic mechanism into a judicial one. The Earth

Union should provide the same: standing for individuals and communities before a Rights Chamber of the Global Court, after exhaustion of national remedies, with binding judgments and supervised execution.

Three groups need explicit protection because majoritarian institutions habitually overlook them.

- a) Minorities require guarantees of language, education, culture and effective participation.
- b) Indigenous peoples require free, prior and informed consent over their lands and resources; the twentieth anniversary of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples falls in 2027 and would be an appropriate occasion for the Union to adopt its own binding standard.
- c) Peoples under colonial or foreign domination retain the right of self-determination, which the Charter should recognize while distinguishing it clearly from a general right of secession from existing states — otherwise no multi-ethnic nation will join.

12. The global commons: oceans, seabed, atmosphere and outer space

The commons are the clearest case for union competence, because no nation can protect them alone and every nation is harmed when they are damaged. Four fronts are live now.

Oceans: The agreement on marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction entered into force on 17 January 2026 and had 101 parties as at 29 September 2026. It creates the first global machinery for high-seas protected areas and environmental-impact assessment, and it is the natural first exclusive competence of an Earth Union.

The deep seabed: The International Seabed Authority still has no adopted exploitation regulations, so the legal framework for commercial mining of the international seabed area remains incomplete while pressure to begin mounts. A union able to legislate here would settle whether the common heritage principle means anything in practice.

Outer space: There is no treaty prohibiting weapons other than weapons of mass destruction in orbit. An open-ended working group on preventing an arms race in outer space met in Geneva from 21 to 25 July 2025, and the General Assembly has called for a moratorium on destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing. Orbital debris and satellite collision avoidance are already governance problems without a governor.

Climate: The thirtieth Conference of the Parties met in Belém from 10 to 21 November 2025 and adopted 56 decisions, while the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage has attracted about USD 822 million in pledges from 27 contributors — a fraction of assessed need. International courts have meanwhile begun to state that climate obligations are legal rather than merely political. A union with binding law and a court is the missing instrument, not another pledge.

13. Technology competences: artificial intelligence, cyber conflict and autonomous weapons

Technologies that cross borders instantly cannot be governed only at national level, and the international system has spent the last two years building the beginnings of a response. The Earth Union should be designed to inherit and strengthen that work rather than duplicate it.

Artificial intelligence: A General Assembly resolution of 26 August 2025 established an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI, whose forty members were appointed in February 2026, and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance launched on 25 September 2025. The Union should give this architecture what it lacks: binding minimum standards, a supervisory authority and judicial review.

Cyber conflict: The open-ended working group on security in the use of information and communications technologies concluded on 11 July 2025 and handed its work to a permanent Global Mechanism. Attribution, thresholds and remedies remain unresolved, which is exactly the kind of question a standing court can answer case by case.

Autonomous weapons: The General Assembly adopted a resolution on lethal autonomous weapons systems on 1 December 2025 by 164 votes to 6 with 7 abstentions. A prohibition on weapons that select and engage human targets without meaningful human control is the clearest candidate for an early, verifiable Union rule.

Information integrity: The European Union's external service catalogued 540 incidents of foreign information manipulation and interference during 2025 in its fourth annual report of 12 March 2026. Any union that holds direct elections must expect its own elections to be targeted, and must legislate for transparency of political advertising, platform accountability and rapid, court-supervised remedies rather than censorship.

14. Migration, mobility and the legal meaning of Global Citizenship

“Global citizenship” must be given legal content or it will be read as a slogan — or worse, as a plan to abolish national citizenship. The European model shows the safe construction: Union citizenship is additional to, and does not replace, national citizenship. Every citizen of a member nation is also a citizen of the Earth Union; no one loses a passport, and no one acquires a second nationality.

The rights attached should begin modestly and be genuinely enforceable: the right to vote for and stand in elections to the Union assembly; the right to petition Union institutions and to complain to a Union ombudsperson in any official language; the right to consular assistance from any member nation where one's own is unrepresented; the right to documentary recognition of legal identity, which hundreds of millions of people still lack; and the right to bring a case before the Rights Chamber.

Free movement of people is the last thing to arrive, not the first. It should be built in stages — mutual visa facilitation, recognition of qualifications, portable social-security and pension entitlements, labor-market access by sector, and only then general residence rights — with each stage conditional on convergence and on the consent of both chambers. Independently of that sequence, the Union should bind itself and its members to non-refoulement, to humane reception standards, to protection of unaccompanied children and to fair burden-sharing when displacement is sudden and large. Nothing damages the credibility of a union of humanity faster than avoidable deaths at its frontiers.

15. Elections, political parties and political finance

A directly elected Human Assembly needs election law, and election law is where unions are usually captured. The Charter should establish the Electoral & Democratic Standards Commission as an independent body with power to certify results and adjudicate disputes, subject to appeal to the Global Court; a common electoral standard covering universal adult suffrage, secret ballot, accessible polling and independent observation; and a rule that seats are apportioned by population on a published formula that is degressively proportional, so that small nations are over-represented relative to strict population but never to the point of frustrating majority rule. Transnational political parties should be recognized and regulated: registration conditional on membership in a minimum number of member nations, internal democracy, published accounts, spending caps for Union campaigns, a complete prohibition on funding from

non-member states and from anonymous sources, and disclosure of every donation above a low threshold. Union funding of parties should be tied to compliance and withdrawable by decision of the Electoral & Democratic Standards Commission subject to judicial review.

Citizens also need agenda-setting power between elections. The European Citizens' Initiative is the working precedent: a threshold of one million signatures across at least a quarter of member states obliges the executive to respond formally, and fourteen initiatives have reached that threshold and obtained a formal answer. Its weakness is instructive — the response is a reply, not a law. The Earth Union should go one step further and require that a successful initiative be tabled, debated and voted in the Assembly of Humanity within a fixed period, with reasons published if it is rejected.

16. Financing the Union and the legitimacy of global taxation

No union survives on voluntary contributions, and none is trusted if it can tax without consent. The Earth Union should therefore be financed in the early phases by assessed contributions calculated from national income with a floor and a ceiling, published in full, audited externally and enforced through the same graduated financial consequences that apply to other breaches of Union law. Arrears should carry loss of voting rights in the Council of Nations after a defined period, as in existing multilateral practice.

Any own resource that resembles a global tax — a levy on international aviation or shipping, on financial transactions, on extraordinary fossil-fuel profits, or a share of a coordinated minimum corporate tax — must require a treaty amendment, ratification by member nations and a two-thirds majority in both chambers, and should be earmarked for a stated purpose with a sunset date. The parallel negotiation of a United Nations framework convention on international tax cooperation is directly relevant: its negotiating committee held its fourth session in February 2026 and is due to deliver texts by 2027. The Union should adopt whatever emerges rather than invent a competing regime.

Cost discipline is a legitimacy question, not an accounting one. The Charter should cap administrative expenditure as a share of the budget, require zero-based review of every program on a fixed cycle, publish every contract above a low threshold in an open data standard, and give the Union's auditor the right to publish adverse findings without clearance from the executive.

17. Representation of women and young people

A union claiming to speak for one human family cannot reproduce the representation gaps of its members. Women held 27.5% of parliamentary seats worldwide at 1 January 2026, an increase of just 0.3 percentage points over the previous year; at that rate parity is generations away. The Union should require gender parity in every body it appoints rather than elects — the executive college, the courts, the auditor's office and the commissions — and should require member nations to publish, though not to guarantee, the gender composition of their delegations.

Young people carry the consequences of decisions taken now and have the least voice in them. The United Nations decided in 2022 to create a Youth Office, led since October 2023 by a dedicated Assistant Secretary-General, to address exactly this. The Union should go further with a Youth Advisory Council of citizens under thirty-five — an advisory body, not a third legislative chamber — elected on the same cycle as the Assembly of Humanity, holding a formal right of opinion on every legislative proposal, a right to require a public reasoned response, and a right to refer proposals with long-term irreversible effects to the Global Court for an opinion on intergenerational equity.

18. Emergency powers and their limits

Unions are most dangerous during emergencies, because that is when powers are seized and seldom returned. The Charter should therefore define emergency narrowly, list the authorities that may be exercised, and hard-code five limits: automatic expiry after a short fixed period unless renewed by supermajorities in both chambers; complete non-derogability of the guarantees listed in the rights architecture above; immediate notification to all members and to the public with reasons; continuous jurisdiction of the Global Court, which may not be suspended; and an obligation on the executive to report to both chambers at short intervals throughout.

The point is not theoretical. The World Health Assembly adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement on 20 May 2025, but it requires 60 ratifications to enter into force and is not yet open for signature, because negotiations on the annex governing pathogen access and benefit-sharing were extended again by the World Health Assembly in May 2026. The world therefore has a political consensus without an operative legal instrument — which is precisely the condition the Earth Union exists to end. A union with a standing emergency role within its shared competences for pandemic and disaster response, a court and a budget can act in the weeks that matter; a conference of parties cannot.

19. Critical questions the Political Union model must answer

- a) **What if the major powers refuse to join?** Do not give them vetoes to induce membership. Begin with willing states, demonstrate economic and security benefits, and keep accession open. A smaller rules-based union is preferable to universal membership that makes rules unenforceable.
- b) **Can authoritarian states be full members?** Full voting membership should require minimum standards for citizen representation, judicial independence and rights. Other states may be associates until those conditions are met; otherwise, the Assembly of Humanity could become democratic in name only.
- c) **Can a member leave?** Yes, through a negotiated withdrawal clause with advance notice. Withdrawal cannot cancel existing debts, pending court judgments, peace obligations or previously agreed disarmament commitments.
- d) **Who may tax?** In early phases, TEU should rely mainly on transparent member contributions. Any later direct revenue stream must be narrowly defined, created by treaty amendment ratified by member nations, approved by two-thirds of both chambers and subject to audit and constitutional limits.
- e) **How is redistribution kept legitimate?** Tie fiscal solidarity to objective human-development indicators, published formulas, co-financing, independent audits and measurable outcomes. Redistribution should be framed as investment in minimum human capability and global stability, not discretionary charity.
- f) **How is global tyranny prevented?** Enumerated powers, subsidiarity, a rights charter, bicameralism, an independent court, fixed executive terms, impeachment, independent audit, transparent lobbying rules, citizen initiative, free media and an orderly withdrawal mechanism.
- g) **What if the TEU itself breaks the law?** Individuals, national governments and institutions must have standing to challenge TEU action before the Court. The Court must be able to suspend unlawful executive action and invalidate legislation outside TEU competence.

20. What would make this fundamentally different from “UN 2.0”?

The United Nations remains indispensable, but its own 2024 Pact for the Future recognizes that global governance and the Security Council need to become more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.

The Earth Union should learn from that history rather than merely criticize it.

Risk to avoid	Earth Union design response
Permanent great-power privilege	No permanent veto. Sensitive decisions use transparent supermajorities that apply equally to all members.
State-only legitimacy	Dual legitimacy: Council of Nations + directly elected Assembly of Humanity.
Mostly non-binding political resolutions	Binding law only in limited transferred competences; compulsory court jurisdiction within those fields.
States can often ignore adverse outcomes	Graduated legal consequences, financial penalties and suspension mechanisms after due process.
Weak constitutional checks on a global executive	Executive constrained by both chambers, court, rights commission, auditor, term limits and impeachment.
Dependence on ad hoc political will	Predictable budget, professional civil service, published rules and automatic procedures.
Security dominated by great-power politics	No country judges its own case; collective-security authorization requires independent legal findings and high democratic thresholds.
Universal membership prioritized over enforceability	Start with a coalition of willing states prepared to accept the rules; widen only as trust and compliance are demonstrated.

21. The practical test for Political Union

The most important test in the original draft should be retained and elevated into a founding principle:

“Will member countries accept a binding adverse judgment when they sincerely believe that judgment harms their immediate national interest?”

If the answer is no, the project is cooperation but not union. If the answer becomes yes—because the jurisdiction is limited, the procedure is fair, the court is independent and the same rules bind all countries—then something historically new has begun.

Recommended immediate objective

The near-term Earth Union mission should be:

“We are different nations, cultures and religions, but we recognize humanity as one family. Let us identify the problems that no nation can solve adequately alone and voluntarily place only those problems under common institutions governed by democratic law.”

This formulation allows Spiritual Union, Economic Union and Political Union to mature together. Spiritual Union develops the moral legitimacy of sacrifice for people outside one’s nation. Economic Union demonstrates that cooperation can improve material life. Political Union then supplies common law only where shared moral purpose and practical interdependence have already made it necessary.

22. Risk register: how the Political Union could fail

A constitutional design should state its own failure modes. The following register lists the thirteen most plausible ways the Political Union could fail, the safeguard built into this design, and the indicator that would show the safeguard is not working.

Risk	How it would appear	Safeguard in this design	Warning indicator
Competence creep	The Union legislates in fields never conferred on it	Closed list of competences; national-parliament subsidiarity objection; treaty amendment required to add powers	Union acts justified by general clauses rather than a named competence
Great-power capture	Two or three members decide outcomes informally	Two-chamber supermajorities with a blocking-minority floor; no permanent vetoes; fixed-term, term-limited executive; rotating chairs of chambers and committees; published voting records	Decisions consistently announced before the vote is taken
Small-state marginalization	Populous members legislate for everyone	Council of Nations with equal votes; degressive proportionality in the Assembly of Humanity; supermajority for competence change	Members below a population threshold never in a winning coalition
Court paralysis	Judicial vacancies are left unfilled and binding review lapses	Automatic appointment procedure with fixed deadlines and default nomination if a member fails to act	Any bench below quorum for more than one term — the WTO Appellate Body precedent
Judicial intimidation	Members sanction or threaten Union judges	Treaty protection of salaries, immunities, travel and families; coercion of the Court is itself a Charter breach	Any member imposing measures on a sitting Union judge or official

Primacy revolt	A national constitutional court declares Union law inapplicable	Primacy confined to conferred competences; preliminary references; mixed competence chamber; financial rather than coercive enforcement	More than one national apex court refusing to apply a Union judgment
Enforcement theatre	Judgments are ignored and nothing follows	Graduated ladder: declaration, timetable, financial penalty, withholding of funds, suspension of privileges	Median time from judgment to compliance exceeding the Charter timetable
Democratic hollowing	Turnout collapses and the Assembly of Humanity loses authority	Real legislative power for the elected chamber; citizens' initiative that must be voted; Youth Advisory Council; open documents by default	Falling turnout across two consecutive elections
Fiscal illegitimacy	The Union appears to tax without consent	Assessed contributions only until a treaty amendment; earmarking and sunset for any own resource; external audit with publication rights	New revenue instruments adopted without ratification by member nations
Emergency entrenchment	Emergency powers are renewed indefinitely	Short automatic expiry; supermajority renewal; non-derogable rights; continuous court jurisdiction; frequent public reporting	A second renewal of the same emergency without new findings of necessity
Religious capture	One tradition acquires privileged access through the Spiritual Union	Strict separation of Spiritual Union from Union office, funds and law-making; equal protection of belief, unbelief and change of belief	Any Union funding, office or immunity attaching to a religious body
Bureaucratic sprawl	Administration grows faster than delivery	Statutory cap on administrative share; zero-based program review on a fixed cycle; open contracting above a low threshold	Administrative spending rising for two consecutive budget cycles
Exit contagion	Early members withdraw and the Union loses credibility	Negotiated withdrawal clause with notice, settlement of obligations and protection of acquired rights; reversible integration by stage	Any withdrawal notice within the first two decades — the ECOWAS precedent

23. Membership-readiness checklist

Full membership of the Limited Constitutional Union (Phase II onward) should be earned rather than granted, and the criteria should be public so that no admission looks political. A candidate nation should be able to demonstrate each of the following before accession, with an independent assessment published in full and a transitional period where a criterion is only partly met.

Requirement	What the candidate must demonstrate
Acceptance of binding jurisdiction	Unconditional acceptance of the Global Court's jurisdiction in the conferred competences, and of the right of individuals to petition the Rights Chamber after exhaustion of national remedies
Constitutional compatibility	A domestic legal route by which Union law takes effect, confirmed by the national apex court or by constitutional amendment
Peaceful dispute record	No unresolved use of force against a neighbor; acceptance of third-party settlement for existing territorial disputes
Rights baseline	Ratification of, or a published timetable to ratify, the core human-rights covenants; no derogation in force beyond the Siracusa tests; a published commitment and timetable towards abolition of, or a moratorium on, the death penalty
Free and observed elections	At least two consecutive national elections held on schedule and assessed as credible by independent observation, with a peaceful transfer of power having occurred
Judicial independence	Security of tenure and pay for judges, transparent appointment, and published compliance with domestic court judgments against the government
Fiscal transparency	Published audited national accounts, an independent audit institution, and open publication of public contracts above a low threshold
Anti-corruption capacity	An operating asset-declaration regime for senior officials, and beneficial-ownership disclosure for companies bidding for public funds
Data and identity safeguards	A functioning data-protection law with an independent regulator, and a legal identity system that is voluntary in use and non-exclusionary in effect

Contribution capacity	Ability to meet assessed contributions within the floor and ceiling formula, or an agreed graduated schedule during transition
Parliamentary consent	Ratification of the Charter by the national legislature, and where the constitution requires it, by referendum

A candidate that cannot meet a criterion should be offered associate status — full participation in cooperation, funding and dialogue, without a vote on binding law — rather than a refusal. Associate status should be reviewed on a fixed cycle and should convert to full membership once the criteria are met and the national ratification process is complete.

24. Will they join the Earth Union?

24.1 Membership and institutional relevance of the 20 organizations

These organizations are not equivalent constitutional objects. The EU, AU and EAEU are treaty-based unions; ASEAN, ECOWAS, MERCOSUR and others are regional organizations that also possess legal personality but have varying degrees of legal integration; G7, G20, BRICS and APEC are primarily coordination forums. Under the proposed TEU model, some could become institutional partners or observers, while their sovereign member states would remain the entities capable of transferring constitutional powers to an Earth Union.

Organization and current members	Why it matters to TEU / main constraint
1. G20 — 19 countries + EU + AU Argentina; Australia; Brazil; Canada; China; France; Germany; India; Indonesia; Italy; Japan; Republic of Korea; Mexico; Russia; Saudi Arabia; South Africa; Türkiye; United Kingdom; United States; plus, the European Union and African Union as regional members.	Already coordinates the largest economies and now includes both the EU and the African Union, so it could serve as a convening bridge. Its informal nature, great-power rivalry and lack of binding law make it more likely to endorse or incubate TEU principles than to transform into TEU. The United States holds the presidency from 1 December 2025 and has signaled a narrower agenda after boycotting the Johannesburg summit of November 2025, which illustrates how quickly consensus formats can lose momentum when they rest on political will alone.
2. G7 — 7 countries (EU participates) Canada; France; Germany; Italy; Japan; United Kingdom; United States. The European Union participates institutionally but is not counted as one of the seven.	Strong rule-of-law and democratic-state traditions could support TEU safeguards, climate action and development finance. Resistance would arise from dilution of existing influence, fiscal redistribution and surrender of sovereign security powers.

Organization and current members	Why it matters to TEU / main constraint
3. OECD — 38 countries Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Korea; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Türkiye; United Kingdom; United States.	Its comparative data, peer review and policy standards are directly useful to a rules-based Earth Union. It is unlikely to become the political core because membership is economically selective and it has no mandate to transfer sovereignty.
4. BRICS — 10 full members + Saudi Arabia (invited) Brazil; China; Egypt; Ethiopia; India; Indonesia; Iran; Russia; Saudi Arabia; South Africa; United Arab Emirates.	Its stated aim of more representative global governance and Global South cooperation aligns with TEU reformism, and it has added ten partner countries (Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam) alongside its full members. Saudi Arabia was invited in 2023 but has not confirmed accession. Consensus decision-making, strong sovereignty norms, sanctions and major-power competition would impede binding supranational law.
5. European Union (EU) — 27 countries Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden.	The EU is the strongest existing precedent for shared sovereignty, dual legitimacy, binding law, courts, budgetary solidarity and subsidiarity. Its members may nevertheless resist subordinating mature EU institutions to a larger global union unless TEU competences are strictly limited and reciprocal.
6. African Union (AU) — 55 member states (6 currently suspended) Algeria; Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cabo Verde; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Republic of the Congo; Côte d'Ivoire; Djibouti; Egypt; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Eswatini; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Nigeria;	Agenda 2063 and the AU's ambition for continental unity, peace and integration are close to TEU logic. Six members are currently suspended after unconstitutional changes of government (Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Sudan), while Gabon and Guinea have been reinstated — evidence that a suspension rule can be applied and then relaxed without destroying the organization. Capacity gaps, varied regimes, fiscal constraints and sensitivity to external dominance mean African states would insist on equality, development justice and strong anti-hegemony safeguards.

Organization and current members	Why it matters to TEU / main constraint
Rwanda; Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic; São Tomé and Príncipe; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Africa; South Sudan; Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Tunisia; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe.	
7. ASEAN — 11 countries Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Indonesia; Lao PDR; Malaysia; Myanmar; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Timor-Leste; Viet Nam.	ASEAN demonstrates durable regional integration among highly diverse states and explicitly links security, economics and social community. Its consensus and non-interference norms make transfer of binding judicial or coercive authority difficult.
8. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) — 10 countries Belarus; China; India; Iran; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Pakistan; Russia; Tajikistan; Uzbekistan.	Its scale, connectivity agenda and interest in a more multipolar order make it strategically important. Strong sovereignty/security orientation, India–Pakistan tensions, China–India rivalry and members under sanctions make binding common law improbable in the near term.
9. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) — 21 member economies Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States; Viet Nam.	APEC proves that highly diverse economies can cooperate on trade, standards and capacity-building. Its commitments are deliberately voluntary and non-binding, so it is a useful pre-union laboratory rather than a ready-made constitutional union.
10. League of Arab States (Arab League) — 22 countries Algeria; Bahrain; Comoros; Djibouti; Egypt; Iraq; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Mauritania; Morocco; Oman; State of Palestine; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Somalia; Sudan; Syria; Tunisia; United Arab Emirates; Yemen.	Shared language/civilizational identity and existing economic/security institutions could facilitate bloc-level dialogue. Deep geopolitical divisions, regime diversity and strong sovereignty norms constrain delegation of binding authority.
11. Commonwealth of Nations — 56 countries Africa: Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia. Asia: Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam,	It already describes itself as a voluntary family of equal nations committed to democracy, human rights, development, peace and consensus. Its weakness for TEU purposes is precisely its non-binding character and uneven compliance with shared values.

Organization and current members	Why it matters to TEU / main constraint
India, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka. Caribbean/Americas: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago. Europe: Cyprus, Malta, United Kingdom. Pacific: Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.	
12. Organization of American States (OAS) — 34 member states Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Bolivia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela.	Its democracy, human-rights, security and peaceful-dispute architecture resembles several TEU functions. Political polarization over intervention, democracy enforcement and the role of the United States would make deeper supranational authority contentious.
13. MERCOSUR — 6 States Parties (5 active) Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Paraguay; Uruguay. Venezuela remains a State Party but is suspended from its rights and obligations.	A customs/common-market tradition and accession rules provide a concrete integration precedent. Domestic political swings, protectionism and recurrent trade disputes demonstrate how difficult it is to make regional commitments consistently binding.
14. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — 6 countries Bahrain; Kuwait; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates.	High fiscal capacity, infrastructure ambition and existing economic/security coordination could make the GCC an important TEU development partner. Monarchical governance, strategic-security dependence and reluctance to dilute national control limit immediate constitutional integration.
15. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — 12 current countries Benin; Cabo Verde; Côte d'Ivoire; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-	Free movement, regional law and peace/security mechanisms make ECOWAS unusually relevant to TEU. The 2025 withdrawals demonstrate the central danger: governments may exit when regional rules conflict with regime or sovereignty interests.

Organization and current members	Why it matters to TEU / main constraint
Bissau; Liberia; Nigeria; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Togo. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger withdrew effective 29 January 2025.	
16. Southern African Development Community (SADC) — 16 countries Angola; Botswana; Comoros; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Eswatini; Lesotho; Madagascar; Malawi; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; Seychelles; South Africa; Tanzania; Zambia; Zimbabwe.	SADC has practical experience in regional infrastructure, trade and peace/security cooperation. Economic asymmetry, state-capacity differences and intergovernmental decision-making limit readiness for deep supranational authority.
17. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) — 8 countries Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; India; Maldives; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka.	Its charter seeks welfare, dignity and collective self-reliance, which aligns closely with TEU. Yet unanimity and the exclusion of bilateral contentious issues — especially amid India–Pakistan rivalry — have produced paralysis: no SAARC summit has been held since the eighteenth summit of 26–27 November 2014. It illustrates exactly why a future union needs stronger dispute-resolution machinery than consensus diplomacy.
18. BIMSTEC — 7 countries Bangladesh; Bhutan; India; Myanmar; Nepal; Sri Lanka; Thailand.	Its functional, project-oriented cooperation across South and Southeast Asia could fit TEU’s gradualist approach. Institutional depth remains limited, and Myanmar-related political tensions plus uneven economic weight complicate deeper integration.
19. Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) — 5 countries Armenia; Belarus; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Russia.	The EAEU already pursues a single market for goods, services, capital and labor, showing that post-Soviet states can pool economic rules. Perceived Russian dominance and current geopolitical confrontation make transfer into a neutral universal union difficult without much stronger equality safeguards.
20. Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) — 18 members Australia; Cook Islands; Federated States of Micronesia; Fiji; French Polynesia; Kiribati; Nauru; New Caledonia; New Zealand; Niue; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Republic of the Marshall Islands; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tonga; Tuvalu; Vanuatu.	Its 2050 Blue Pacific strategy is built around collective stewardship, climate security and regional solidarity—ideas very close to TEU’s human-family logic. Small-island sovereignty concerns and the presence of Australia/New Zealand alongside microstates require strong equality and anti-domination protections.

24.2 Assessment: will they join?

The central lesson from these twenty organizations is that political union is no longer an entirely hypothetical human activity. States already pool sovereignty, coordinate policy, accept common standards, finance regional public goods and—in a smaller number of cases—submit to common courts. Yet the depth of commitment varies enormously.

The European Union is closest to the constitutional logic proposed for TEU: powers are conferred by treaty, subsidiarity limits central action, citizens and states are both represented, and binding law is judicially enforceable. The African Union is normatively important for a different reason: its founding act combines sovereign equality with a continental aspiration to unity and even recognizes a Union role in grave circumstances such as genocide and crimes against humanity. These two organizations therefore offer different but complementary precedents—one for supranational law, the other for continental solidarity and anti-colonial equality.

Several organizations could become natural bridges because their declared values already resemble elements of the Earth Union. The Commonwealth speaks of a voluntary “family” of equal states and commits itself to democracy, human rights, rule of law, development, peace and the basic needs of citizens. ECOWAS has gone further operationally through free movement, regional legal institutions and security mechanisms; MERCOSUR and the EAEU demonstrate that states can create common markets; the Pacific Islands Forum’s Blue Pacific approach treats climate, oceans and security as shared regional responsibilities; and SADC and BIMSTEC have accumulated practical habits of cooperation in infrastructure, development and security. For TEU, these bodies would be more useful as federating building blocks than as structures to abolish. A realistic strategy would invite them to recognize TEU principles, harmonize compatible standards and eventually negotiate inter-regional compacts.

Other blocs possess enormous demographic or economic weight but are constitutionally less prepared for union.

- **The G20** is indispensable because its members account for roughly 85% of global GDP and about two-thirds of humanity, yet it is deliberately informal and contains rival great powers.
- **The G7** has far stronger institutional and democratic commonality but would risk losing privileged influence in a one-humanity system with broader redistribution and equal-state safeguards.
- **The OECD** could contribute standards, data and peer review, but it is not designed to exercise political sovereignty.
- **APEC** likewise shows that rivals can cooperate economically, but it explicitly relies on voluntary, non-binding consensus. These organizations could therefore provide technical architecture, financing and agenda-setting long before they could provide constitutional authority.
- **BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization** are particularly important tests of whether TEU can transcend geopolitical camps. BRICS explicitly seeks a more representative international order and gives the Global South a stronger voice; **its ten full members now encompass close to half of humanity.** The SCO

covers much of Eurasia and includes China, India, Russia, Pakistan and Iran. Both could be attracted to TEU's promise that no permanent veto and no single civilization should dominate global governance. Yet the same members place great weight on sovereignty, strategic autonomy and consensus, and several have unresolved security disputes with one another. Their likely first step would therefore be participation in development, infrastructure, climate, health or dispute-prevention mechanisms—not acceptance of a global court with power to overrule them.

- **ASEAN, Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council:** The same sovereignty dilemma appears in ASEAN, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. ASEAN has successfully maintained peace and economic integration among extraordinarily diverse political systems, but its culture of consultation, consensus and non-interference would resist intrusive TEU authority. The Arab League and GCC possess civilizational affinity, capital and established coordination machinery, yet regional rivalries and different regime types make a common democratic constitutional order difficult. Conversely, the Organization of American States already has democracy, human-rights and peaceful-dispute institutions, but hemispheric polarization and long-standing controversy over intervention and the weight of the United States would make deeper delegation of power politically sensitive. In each case, TEU would need to prove that common rules protect small states from powerful ones rather than create a new channel for domination.
- **SAARC** illustrates the warning most directly. Its charter aims at welfare, dignity and collective self-reliance, but requires unanimity and excludes bilateral contentious issues. Because the most serious South Asian security dispute is precisely bilateral, the institution has repeatedly been unable to perform the conflict-resolution role that deeper union would require. This supports the governance model proposed for TEU: political union cannot depend on unanimity, cannot allow a state to judge its own case, and needs independent adjudication for disputes voluntarily placed within common jurisdiction.
- **BIMSTEC's** more functional cooperation may be a more workable near-term South Asian bridge, but it too lacks the constitutional depth required for binding global government.

Accordingly, the question should not be whether these twenty organizations will dissolve themselves and “join” a new world body. That framing would trigger institutional self-preservation and national resistance. The more plausible multi-generation pathway is nested integration. Existing organizations remain intact; they become partners in a TEU Charter process; willing member states adopt a Human Family Declaration and common development standards; compatible regional courts, markets and mobility systems are linked; and only later do states transfer narrowly defined global competences—such as interstate aggression, nuclear risk, catastrophic climate threats, pandemic coordination and specified global public goods—to common institutions. Regional organizations can then act as transmission belts between national governments and the Earth Union.

The decisive dividing line is therefore not cultural similarity but constitutional willingness. An organization is a plausible gateway to TEU when its members can accept three propositions: first, that other peoples and states possess equal moral and political standing; second, that a limited class of transnational problems requires rules that bind even the losing side; and third, that those rules must be administered through institutions strong enough to constrain powerful members but limited enough not to become tyrannical. The EU currently comes closest to this standard; the AU, Commonwealth, ECOWAS and Pacific Islands Forum offer important normative or regional foundations; G20, BRICS, SCO, G7, OECD and APEC possess indispensable scale and resources; and SAARC demonstrates the cost of allowing unanimity and unresolved rivalry to disable collective action. The Earth Union should therefore be conceived not as a competitor that replaces these organizations, but as a constitutional destination toward which different regional and functional systems may converge at different speeds.

Practical implication for TEU: Do not ask existing blocs to abolish themselves. Ask them first to become partners in a Human Family Charter, common development floor, interoperable institutions and peaceful dispute-resolution network. Political federation, if it ever comes, should emerge only after regional organizations and sovereign states have demonstrated that binding cooperation works and that no permanent power center can dominate the system.

25. Conclusion

The Earth Union becomes considerably more practical when recast as an evolutionary constitutional project: begin with a spiritual and economic coalition, let a limited group of willing states prove the value of binding cooperation, and expand authority only when citizens and nations have experienced the system as fair. Political Union would then be the culmination of trust built by Spiritual Union and Economic Union.

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https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=21&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=XXI-10&src=TREATY
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<https://isa.org.jm/news/the-council-of-the-international-seabed-authority-advanced-negotiations-on-the-mining-code/>
 31. UNFCCC — COP30, Belém, 10–21 November 2025 — <https://unfccc.int/cop30/ifp>
 32. COP30 Presidency — 56 normative decisions — <https://cop30.br/en/cop30-outcomes/normative>
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<https://www.who.int/health-topics/who-pandemic-agreement>
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<https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>
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<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/indigenouspeoples/emrip/a-hrc-emrip-2026-1-aev.pdf>
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<https://financing.desa.un.org/inc/fourthsession>
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55. European Commission — MERCOSUR: States Parties and the suspension of Venezuela https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur_en
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58. SAARC — Charter, the unanimity rule and the exclusion of bilateral contentious issues <https://www.saarc-sec.org/index.php/about-saarc/saarc-charter>
59. SAARC — summit record: the last summit was the eighteenth, on 26–27 November 2014 <https://nepal.saarc-sec.org/index.php/about-saarc/saarc-structure/saarc-summits>
60. BIMSTEC — seven member states — <https://bimstec.org/member-states>
61. Eurasian Economic Union — five member states and the single market — <http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en>
62. Pacific Islands Forum — 18 members and the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent — <https://forumsec.org/pacific-islands-forum>